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Reverse Contributors? African State Parties, ICSID, and the Development of International
Investment Law
Olabisi D. Akinkugbe*
Abstract
International investment disputes involving African states before the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) have generated significant critical inquiry.
Yet, accounts of their contribution to the development of international investment law as
a result of these dispute are limited. This article addresses this gap. It examines the
contribution of some of the high-profile ICSID disputes involving African states to the
development of international investment law. Notwithstanding the charges against
African States in ICSID, I contend that the involvement of African States in ICSID
Disputes has contributed to the development of international investment law. In
particular, the jurisprudence that these ICSID case law has generated, not only affirm
principles of international investment law, but more importantly, have opened new paths
over the years for the development of international investment law.
Introduction
Foreign direct investment is a critical component of the external source of finance for many
developing countries.1 The mechanisms for the settlement of disputes between multinational or
transnational corporations (as investors) and the states have been contentious.2 In the context of
Assistant Professor, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax, N.S., Canada. Ph.D., (University of
Ottawa); LLM (University of Toronto), LLB (Hons) (University of Lagos, Nigeria), email:
Olabisi.akinkugbe@dal.ca. I thank Professor Makane Moïse Mbengue for the invitation to contribute to this ICSIDReview special issue on Africa and the ICSID System. Thanks also to the anonymous peer-reviewers and to Prof.
James Thuo Gathii for their helpful feedback. The usual caveats apply.
1 According to UNCTAD, “FDI [Foreign Direct Investment] inflows to Africa are forecast to increase by about 20
per cent in 2018, to $50 billion. The projection is underpinned by the expectation of a continued modest recovery in
commodity prices, and by macroeconomic fundamentals. In addition, advances in interregional cooperation, through
the signing of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) could encourage stronger FDI flows in 2018. Yet
Africa’s commodity dependence will cause FDI to remain cyclical.” UNCTAD World Investment Report 2018,
“Investment and New Industrial Policies”, online: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2018_en.pdf; Olabisi
D. Akinkugbe and Sara Seck, “2017 Developments in Home and Host State Policy Responses to Foreign Direct
Investment”, in Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2017, Lisa E. Sachs, Lise J. Johnson, and Jesse
Coleman (eds.), (Oxford University Press), pp. 49-64
At the continental level, international investment regime in Africa and the settlement of investment disputes
is at a unique cross-road. There are regimes at the regional and national levels for the protection of foreign direct
investment. Most recently is contentious debate on the ‘Africanization’ of international investment law as
championed by the Pan-African Investment Code. See, Makane Moïse Mbengue and Stefanie Schacherer, “The
‘Africanization’ of International Investment Law: The Pan-African Investment Code and the Reform of the
International Investment Regime”, (2017) 18:3 The Journal of World Investment & Trade, pp. 414-448; Erik
Denters and Tarcisio Gazzini, “The Role of African Regional Organizations in the Promotion and Protection of
Foreign Investment” (2017) 18:3 The Journal of World Investment & Trade, pp. 449-492.
For an alternative argument, see, Won Kidane, “Contemporary International Investment Law Trends and
Africa’s Dilemmas in the Draft Pan-African Investment Code”, (2018) Vol. 50 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev., pp.
523-579. (Arguing that Africa confronts significant ‘dilemmas’ with the Code once situated in the context of
historical, extant and developing trends in international investment law. In Kidane’s view, “the code does not
resolve Africa’s dilemmas; it merely codifies them.”)
2 Leon E. Trakman, “The ICSID Under Siege”, (2012) Vo. 45 Cornell International Law Journal, pp. 604-663.
(Evaluating the criticisms leveled at the ICSID and contending that “a contrite and diffident defense of the ICSID is
*
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the resolution of investor-state disputes before the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID), there are skeptics and optimists of the forum.3 ICSID’s paramount
objective is to “promote a climate of mutual confidence between investors and states favourable
to increasing the flow of resources to developing countries under reasonable conditions.”4 Now
in its fifty-second year, in 2018, 57 new cases were registered and ICSID administered 279 –
“the greatest number of cases ever administered in a single year.”5 19% of the disputes registered
in 2018 under the ICSID Convention and additional facility rules by region involved subSaharan African states.6 Between 1972 and 2017, African states have been a party to at least 144
investor-state ICSID cases.7
The participation of African state parties in ICSID administered investor-state disputes has been
fierce and is far from settled.8 On the one hand, some scholars opine that African states were
critical actors in the process that led to the establishment of ICSID and as such were conscious of
the transformative potential of the ICSID system for the economic development of their
economies.9 On the other hand, a different strand of scholarship that is more critical argues that
colonial and post-colonial factors provide important context that illuminate the power asymmetry
that were embedded in the establishment of ICSID. As such, they are less optimistic and perhaps
more sceptical of the dispute mechanism and its claim to equality of parties among other factors.
At the heart of these views emerges a murky narrative of the participation, and possibly
that its problems can be ascribed to the complexity of the multiple layers of investment law and that ICSID
arbitration is one among multiple means of solving conflicts with real human, social and political potency. As such,
it should not be construed as an end in itself.)
3 M. Sornarajah, Resistance and Change in the International Law on Foreign Investment, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2015); [*]
4 Ibrahim T.I. Shihata, “Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and
MIGA”,
(1992:
Washington
DC,
World
Bank),
1-32,
pp.
5-6
Online:
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/335931468315286974/Towards-a-greater-depoliticization-ofinvestment-disputes-the-roles-of-ICSID-and-MIGA
5 ICSID, 2018 Annual Report, (Sept. 6, 2018) p. 11. This was a 16% increase over the number of cases registered in
2017.
6 Ibid.
7 Paul-Jean Le Cannu, “Foundation and Innovation: The Participation of African States in the ICSID Dispute
Resolution System”, (2018) ICSID Review, pp. 1-45, pp. 40-45 (List of ICSID Cases involving African State
Parties); Won Kidane, “The China-Africa Factor in the Contemporary ICSID Legitimacy Debate” (2014) Vol. 35,
No.3, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, pp. 560-604, pp. 624-673.
8 Won Kidane argues that “When the World Bank asked the newly independent African states to join ICSID in
1964, they were rather unsure of what it meant for them beyond the promise of increased foreign investment …
Then, predictably, many African states appeared before ICSID tribunals over the years, accused of unlawful
expropriation and denial of justice … With almost no participation in the decision-making process, … the African
states continued to accept the “creditors’ interpretation” of the investment treaties with their wealthier and more
powerful partners.” Won Kidane, “Contemporary International Investment Law Trends and Africa’s Dilemmas in
the Draft Pan-African Investment Code”, (2018) Vol. 50 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev., pp. 523-579, pp. 533-534.
9 “… fifteen of the twenty instruments of ratification, the deposit of which brought the ICSID Convention into force,
came from African States — Benin, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of the Congo,
Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, and Uganda (the
other five came from Iceland, Jamaica, Malaysia, the Netherlands and the United States).” Judge Charles N. Brower
and Michael P. Daly, “A Study of Foreign Investment Law in Africa: Opportunity Awaits”, online:
<https://www.arbitrationicca.org/media/7/82088225980224/brower__daly_a_study_of_foreign_investment_law_in_africa.pdf> pp. 4-10.
(“Africa’s Historical Role Within Foreign Investment Law”) p. 5; AA Agyemang, “African states and ICSID
arbitration”, (1988) Comp. & Int’l L.J. S. Afr., pp. 177 – 189, (examining “the extent of African utilization of ICSID
for purposes of settling investment disputes and the factors which possibly account for such utilization or nonutilization of the facilities of the Centre.”), p. 177.
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contribution of African states to the development of international investment law on the one
hand, and ICSID case law, on the other hand.
Significant critical work has been done that focused on the marginality of African states in the
evolution of international law and other international legal fields.10 Whereas theoretical
approaches such as Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), and in the context
of continental investment law, the ‘Africanization’ of international investment law thesis
championed by Makane Mbengue, has attempted to reclaim some of Africa's role in this process,
albeit not without its complexity, it is important to avoid critique that inadvertently perpetuates
the ‘dilemmas’ – as Won Kidane conceptualizes – of the role of African states in the on-going
development of international legal fields.
Particularly, in the context of contentious ‘organic’ or non-organic evolution of international
investment law, while African states may not have participated equally or at all in some of the
institutions or organizations and the dispute settlement that demarcate the contours of
international law and international investment law, this article argues that such analysis should
not foreclose the possibility of accounting for subsequent contributions of African states to the
development of the regimes, especially, in the post-colonial era. As a caveat, the case for
conceptualizing African state parties as reverse contributors to the development of international
investment law and ICSID case law should not be constructed as blind to the power relations that
are embedded in the international legal structures that constrain African states. Similarly, this is
not an argument for African exceptionalism as it may be possible to draw similar arguments in
the context of other regions that comprise the Third World. Rather, while I acknowledge these
challenges, this article contributes to the scholarly work that tease out African states'
contribution, despite the murkiness of the critical debates.11 Put conversely, an analysis of the
contribution of African states to the development of international investment law as undertaken
in this article, does not undermine the on-going critique of the work of many scholars, rather, it
strengthens it by illuminating nuanced implications that have arisen from the disputes involving
African states.
Based on the analysis of some high-profile investment disputes involving African states, I
contend that the jurisprudence emerging from these disputes have contributed to the
development, shaping, evolution, and contour mapping of international investment law. While I
acknowledge the critique that African states have mostly been involved in the investment
disputes as Respondents, I argue that this fact should not limit our analysis of the contribution
that the issues decided upon by the Arbitral Tribunal have made to the development and
evolution of international investment law. Being a respondent in a dispute is not synonymous
Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development Economic Growth and the Politics of
Universality, (Cambridge University Press, 2011); _________, “The Postcoloniality of International Law”, (2005)
46:2 Harvard International Law Journal, pp. 459-469; Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “Critical Third World Approaches to
International Law (TWAIL): Theory, Methodology, or Both?”, (2008) 10 International Community Law Review,
pp. 371-378; ______, “Newness, Imperialism, and International Legal Reform in Our Time: A TWAIL
Perspective”, (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall Law Journal, pp. 171-191.
11 Paul-Jean Le Cannu, “Foundation and Innovation: The Participation of African States in the ICSID Dispute
Resolution System”, (2018) ICSID Review, pp. 1-45; Ibironke Odumosu-Ayanu, “International Investment
Arbitration and Corruption Claims: An Analysis of World Duty Free v. Kenya” (2011) 4 Law and Development
Review Article 5; Tsotang Tsietsi, “International Commercial Arbitration: Case Study of the Experiences of African
States in the international Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes”, (2013) 47 The International Lawyer, pp.
249-271.
10
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with being passive in the matter. At a time when international investment law is under a
significant call for transformation, there is an opportunity to also reflect on the contribution of
African states in investment related disputes before the ICSID Tribunal overtime.
In Part I, I develop the thesis that high-profile investment disputes involving African states as
respondents should be understood not simply for the substantive matters they resolve. Rather, by
reconceptualizing the role of the African state respondents as reverse contributors to the
jurisprudence that these disputes have produced, we are able to capture the value of these highprofile cases to the evolution and development of international investment law overtime. HighProfile international investment disputes involving African states are delineated by the fact that
the substantive issues that the Tribunal issued awards or procedural orders on not only reinforce
aspects of ICSID and international investment law rules, but they also clarify concepts and at
other times deliberate on novel matters that no previous arbitral tribunal has ruled upon. In Part
II, I analyze the contributions of these selected high-profile investment disputes involving
African states by categorizing them into three (3) generations. The Frist-Generation of highprofile cases map investment disputes that occurred from the late 1970s to 1990s; the SecondGeneration then starts from 2000s to 2010; while the Third-Generation is from 2010 to the
present. It is important to note that the periodization adopted in this article is not static nor are
they intended to be interpreted as linear. Rather, they are fluid and overlapping and have been
marked by a definite period for the purpose of analyses of the disputes over the 50 years of
ICSID that was recently celebrated. In the concluding section of the article, I contend that
looking back, despite the challenges and backlash that African states have faced as Respondents
in ICSID arbitral disputes, international investment disputes involving African States have not
only contributed to the development of international investment law, but African states continue
to be an important player today with even better prospects for the future given the growing wave
of arbitral regulatory regimes in the continent as well as future investment opportunities that will
draw on foreign investors.12
Part I
African State Respondents as Reverse Contributors in ICSID Investment Disputes
In the context of international law scholarship, the Euro-centric antecedents and the participation
of developing countries and African states in particular have been analyzed with significant
academic rigour in the studies on resistance movements, anti-colonialism, and even in postcolonial African states.13 Similar questions loom with respect to the origins and evolution of
Judge Charles N. Brower and Michael P. Daly, “A Study of Foreign Investment Law in Africa: Opportunity
Awaits”,
online:
<https://www.arbitrationicca.org/media/7/82088225980224/brower__daly_a_study_of_foreign_investment_law_in_africa.pdf> pp. 4-10.
(“Africa’s Historical Role Within Foreign Investment Law”); Won Kidane, “Alternatives to Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: An African Perspective”, Global Economic Governance Discussion Paper, January 2018
13 See generally, Rajagopal Balakrishnan, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and
Third World Resistance, (Cambridge University Press, 2003); James Thuo Gathii, “International Law and
Eurocentricity” (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law, pp. 184-211; Anthony Anghie, “The Evolution of
International Law: colonial and postcolonial realities”, (2006) Vol. 27, No. 5, Third World Quarterly, pp. 739753.(sketching a history of the relationship between imperialism and international law in the evolution of
international law from the 16th century).
12
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international investment law.14 From this perspective, the history of Africa’s ‘dilemmas’ as it
relates to ICSID is intricately interwoven with the Eurocentric foundations of international
investment law.15 For example, Won Kidane contends that “[t]he historical record clearly
indicates that the only reason that the African states accepted ICSID is because they thought that
they had to do so in order to attract private foreign investment to develop their ailing postcolonial economies.”16 In this regard, the ratification of the ICSID Convention by African States
not only has the potential for an enhanced flow of foreign investment but also, it affirms the
sovereign status of African states in early post-colonial Africa.17 More recently, Kidane asserts
further that:
“International investment law [IIL] comes with a very old and lingering historical
baggage that continues to engender doctrinal confusion and outright suspicion … IIL is
not made by Africa, it was made for Africa as a replacement for colonial rules for the
protection of capital.”18
Kidane conceptualizes ICSID creation as part of a robust plan that Joost Pauwelyn alluded to in
his description of programs that were constructed and strategies for investment protection that
were meant to avoid the economic collapse of the 1930s. While Kidane argues that it will be
difficult to sustain Pauwelyn’s claim that international investment law is “organic and
incremental,”19 in probing Pauwelyn’s incrementality and organic thesis on the origin of
international investment law, Kidane inevitably inserts the controversial debate around Africa’s
role in the development of international law.20 A strand of the debate on the contribution of
Africa to the development of international law centres around the role of African elites. The
work of some of the African elite intellectuals that were involved in the development of the
universal norms of public international law and by extension the negotiation, drafting and
establishment of the ICSID Convention are critical.
Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn, and Jorge E. Viñuales (eds.) The Foundations of International Investment Law:
Bringing Theory into Practice, (2014: Oxford University Press); Georges Abi-Saab, “The third World intellectual in
praxis: confrontation, participation, or operation behind enemy lines?” (2016) 37:11 Third World Quarterly, pp.
1957-1971.
15 Won Kidane, “Contemporary International Investment Law Trends and Africa’s Dilemmas in the Draft PanAfrican Investment Code”, pp. 528-534.
16 Won Kidane, “Alternatives to Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An African Perspective”, Global Economic
Governance Discussion Paper, January 2018; Won Kidane, “The China-Africa Factor in the Contemporary ICSID
Legitimacy Debate”, (2014) 35 U. Penn. J. Int’l L. p. 559 at 585-86.) Daniel Behn, Tarald Berge & Malcolm
Langford, “Poor States or Poor Governance: Explaining Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2018) 38:3
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, pp. 335-382.
17 Tsotang Tsietsi, “International Commercial Arbitration: Case Study of the Experiences of African States in the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes”, (2013) 47 The International Lawyer, pp. 249-271.
(Questioning whether the membership of ICSID has necessarily resulted in increased investment flows).
18 Won Kidane, “Contemporary International Investment Law Trends and Africa’s Dilemmas in the Draft PanAfrican Investment Code”, p. 526.
19 Joost Pauwelyn, “Rational Design or Accidental Evolution? The Emergence of International Investment Law” in
The Foundations of International Investment Law: Bringing Theory into Practice, Zachary Douglas, Joost
Pauwelyn, and Jorge E. Viñuales (eds.) (2014: Oxford University Press), pp. 10-43
20 For a more recent survey of these debates, see, James Thuo Gathii, “Africa and the History of International Law”,
Albany Law School Research Paper No. 48 of 2011/2012, Dieng, Adama in Jeremy Levitt (ed.) Mapping New
Boundaries in African International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2008); M. W. Mutua, ‘(Book Review) Africa:
Mapping New Boundaries in international Law by Jeremy I. Levitt’ (2010) 104 American Journal of International
Law, pp. 532-538; Jeremy I. Levitt, “The African Origins of International Law: Myth or Reality? (2015) 19:113
UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, pp. 114-158.
14
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One of these elites whose work has been significantly scrutinized is Taslim Olawale Elias.21
Elias participated in the ICSID negotiation process as the Attorney-General of Nigeria. He later
became a judge of the International Court of Justice.22 In heartily recommending the Preliminary
Draft of the ICSID Convention, Elias described it as
“an attempt not only to restore the confidence of the investor but also to codify certain
principles of customary law and to engage in the progressive development of
international law, and he warmly recommended it.”23
James Gathii argues that Elias was innovative in his use of history to “reclaim or claim a place in
international legal history for Africa” … “because Elias sought not to reject international law for
its legacy and participation in the colonization of Africa, but rather sought to use these legal tools
as best as he could to reform international law to serve the newly independent countries.”24 Elias’
support of ICSID came at a hopeful moment for Africa – right after decolonization and although
Africa was experiencing its first series of internal challenges, Elias did not abandon his faith in
the transformative potential of international law and of foreign investment.25
In relation to the praxis of international investment law, in his recent book, The Culture of
International Arbitration, Kidane took on a “cultural critique of international arbitration.”26
Drawing on his personal experiences from arbitral hearings, Kidane masterfully interrogates the
cultural complexity that is embedded and are regularly confronted in the inner chambers of
arbitral proceedings – many of which we do not get to hear because of the confidentiality of the
process.27 In Kidane’s view, contemporary international arbitration as characterized by a
diversified user base must account for these variations in process and practice. Reviewing this
book, Makane Moïse Mbengue and Elise Ruggeri Abonnat aptly describe “Kidane’s analysis [a]s
a legitimate reminder that the status quo is not an option as well as a prompt reminder … that

James Thuo Gathii, “A Critical Appraisal of the International Legal Tradition of Taslim Olawale Elias”, (2008) 21
Leiden Journal of International Law, pp. 317-349. The volume was dedicated to an examination of the works of
leading international legal jurists.
22 Elias T. Olawale, Africa and the Development of International Law, [1972]
23 ICSID, History of the ICSID Convention: Documents Concerning the Origin and Formulation of the Convention
(1968) Volume II-1, p. 244
24 Gathii, “A Critical Appraisal of the International Legal Tradition of Taslim Olawale Elias”, p. 347.
25 Yet, at the time Elias wrote, there were other contemporaries such as Julius Nyerere who were critical and less
optimistic of the transformative potential of international (investment) law. See, Jeannette Hartmann, “Development
Policy-Making in Tanzania 1962-1982: A Critique of Sociological Interpretations”, Philosophy, University of Hull,
1983,
online:
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel01266236/file/THESES%20%28PHDs%29%20The%20University%20of%20Hull%20Development%20Policymaking%20in%20Tanzania%201962-1982%20A%20Critique%20of%20Sociological%20Interpretations.pdf
26 Won L. Kidane, The Culture of International Arbitration, (2017: Cambridge University Press), p. 4. Also see
generally, Tom Ginsburg, “The Culture of Arbitration”, (2003) 36 Vand. J. Int’L Law, p. 1335.
27 For example, following a vivid explanation of one of the proceedings he was involved, he notes:
“The problem – which is almost always framed in the context of the incompetence of the local
representatives of the parties and witnesses who come from cultures outside of the cultures that dominate
international arbitration – is almost never framed in the context of cultural competence of the tribunals to
understand and serve the parties who selected them, or who make their selection possible, but, rather is
framed as the cultural deficiency or incompetence of the parties or their representatives who appear before
such tribunals.” Kidane, P. 6, Ibid.
21
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“Not only must justice be done; it must also be seen to be done.””28 Despite the fact that African
states’ participation in the status quo continues in “the same terrain of hegemonic international
[investment] law,” the seeds for potential change and reforms that address the critiques of ICSID
lie with the liberal promises of international investment law.29
In this regard, other scholars such as Mark Fathi Massoud, have drawn attention to the intricate
and mutuality of international arbitration and judicial politics in authoritarian states. Massoud
argues that in the context of Sudan, a commitment to arbitration is a signal to investors that their
concerns are its priorities and that “parties to a contractual agreement choose arbitration because
of its flexibility in an uncertain business climate…”30 According to Massoud, “authoritarian
regimes, particularly those in politically fragile and resource-rich contexts, are agreeing to
submit to international arbitration clauses in order to (1) promote investment or economic
liberalization and (2) make promises to foreign investors that mitigate uncertainty in the event of
a dispute.”31 Regardless of the view one holds of ICSID, and the backlash against investment and
arbitration,32 It is instructive to note as Ibrahim Shihata and Sergio Puig have stated that “ICSID
should not be assessed solely on the basis of effects as an international adjudicatory body.”33
With the foregoing in mind, I now turn to the elaboration of the concept of African parties as
reverse contributors. The participation of African states was critical to the establishment of
ICSID. As Paul-Jean Le Cannu observes, “the distinctive role that African states played in
shaping the nascent ICSID system set the stage for their continued contribution to its
evolution.”34 Similarly, A.A. Agyemang declares that “judging from [the] role of African states
in ICSID institutions … African states ought to call [ICSID] their own and have confidence in to
settle their investment disputes”35 However, beyond their role in the establishment of ICSID,
African states have been important actors in the development of ICSID jurisprudence. As at
December 2017, African states has been involved as a party in over 140 disputes. Deriving from
this high level of participation in disputes, I argue that the jurisprudence that emerges from these
For a review of Kidane’s book, Makane Moïse Mbengue and Elise Ruggeri Abonnat, (2017) Ethiopian Yearbook
of International Law, 221-225, p. 225.
29 Gathii, James Thuo, “The Agenda of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL)” (December 20,
2018). Forthcoming in Jeffrey Dunoff and Mark Pollack (eds) International Legal Theory: Foundations and
Frontiers, Cambridge University Press (2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3304767, pp. 1-45, p.
41.
30 Mark Fathi Massoud, “International Arbitration and Judicial Politics in Authoritarian States”, (2014) 39:1, Law &
Social Inquiry, pp. 1-30
31 Ibid, pp. 22-23.
32 Georges Abi-Saab, “The Third World intellectual in praxis: confrontation, participation, or operation behind
enemy lines?” (2016) 37:11 Third World Quarterly, pp. 1957-1971.
33 Sergio Puig, “Recasting ICSID’s Legitimacy Debate – Towards a Goal-Based Empirical Agenda”, (2013) 36:2
Fordham International Law Journal, pp. 466-504, p. 469. Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, “Towards a Greater Depoliticization
of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA”, (1986) 1:1 ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law
Journal, pp. 1-25; “ICSID should not be solely regarded as a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes …
ICSID must be regarded as an instrument of international policy for the promotion of investments and of economic
development.” pp. 5-6
34 Cannu, “Foundation and Innovation: The Participation of African States in the ICSID Dispute Resolution
System”, supra note 7, p. 3; Karel Daele, “Africa’s Track Record in ICSID Proceedings”, Kluwer Arbitration Blog
(30 May 2012), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2012/05/30/africas-track-record-in-icsid-proceedings/,
(accessed 27 October, 2018); Judge Charles N. Brower and Michael P. Daly, “A Study of Foreign Investment Law
in Africa: Opportunity Awaits”, supra note 3; Won Kidane, “The China-Africa Factor in the Contemporary ICSID
Legitimacy Debate”, (2014) 35 U. Penn. J. Int’l L. p. 559 at 599.
35 A.A. Agyemang, p. 183.
28
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disputes has not only advanced substantive concepts in international investment law, but also
clarified aspects of the discipline while simultaneously contributing to the development of ICSID
case law and procedures.
As reverse contributors the focus is two-fold: (i) the fact that they are mostly respondent parties;
and, (ii) the type of arguments that they have raised and the opportunity it has provided for the
development of ICSID case law and by extension, the field of international investment law.
Reverse contributors therefore denote the fact that while these states may not have been the
claimants, their role as respondents who were actively involved in the cases, and in particular,
the arguments they advanced and the reports of the tribunal in affirming or rejecting them, have
advanced our understanding of international investment law rules and concepts. In other words,
the primary focus is not on the fact that the arguments proffered by the states through their
counsel have been adopted by the tribunal. Rather, it is in the overall outcome effect it has had
for an elaboration of concepts and the provisions of the investment agreements out of which the
dispute has arisen.
Reverse contributors as conceptualized in this article does not preclude critique nor does it signal
at cooptation. To use Georges Abi-Saab’s description, it also does not exclude ‘operations
behind enemy lines.’36 In other words, while reform of the ICSID system is an on-going process,
African states continue to be involved in disputes, hence, it is important to account for the role or
value they add to the system simultaneously with the process of exposing the defects of the
system. In this regard, African state parties are reverse contributors precisely because of the
historical and contemporary complexity, power relations and rules of the game that discipline
their involvement in ICSID arbitrations. As reverse contributors, they are not wedded to global
capital lock, stock and barrel.
As reverse contributors in the substantive development of international investment principles,
their push-back at different stages, strategies of defence, and willingness to not just accept the
position of the investors or transnational corporations provided a rich opportunity overtime for
the elaboration of the ICSID rules on various issues in international investment law while also
pushing the boundaries to new areas.37 While a case-by-case country defence strategy is beyond
the scope of this article38, there is a considerably wide array and complex permutations of the
background factors that drive the approach of the various African states that have been involved
in ICSID arbitration.39 As will become evident from the analyses of some high-profile ICSID
cases in the next section, African countries engagement with ICSID and the consequential
elaboration of ICSID rules have consistently grown over the first fifty years of ICSID – as the
saying goes, it takes two to tango!

Georges Abi-Saab, “The Third World intellectual in praxis: confrontation, participation, or operation behind
enemy lines?” (2016) 37:11 Third World Quarterly, pp. 1957-1971, 1964.
37 Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Chung & Claire Balchin (eds), The Backlash Against
Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality, (Hague: Kluwer Law, 2010)
38 Julia Calvert, “State Strategies for the Defence of Domestic Interest in investor-State Arbitration”, International
Institute for Sustainable Development, February 29, 2016. Online: https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/02/29/statestrategies-for-the-defence-of-domestic-interests-in-investor-state-arbitration-julia-calvert/
39 Langford, M., Behn, D., & Fauchald, O. “Backlash and State Strategies in International Investment Law” in T.
Aalberts & T. Gammeltoft-Hansen (Eds.), The Changing Practices of International Law, pp. 70-102. (2018:
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
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Viewed from this perspective, African states, as reverse contributors to ICSID jurisprudence and
case law, are indeed shapers of the ICSID policy development, beyond the critical role they
played in the establishment of the system. In Part II, I examine some of the high-profile disputes
involving African states in respect of which consequential rulings have been delivered by the
ICSID Tribunal.
Part II
Generations of Disputes involving African States over the International Investment Years
As of December 31 2017, African states have been involved in one hundred and seventy one
(171) cases before the ICSID Tribunal.40 The transnational economic relations between postcolonial African states and investor industrialized corporations have generated a significant
amount of investment related disputes. The analysis of some of the investment disputes involving
African countries is undertaken in the ensuing sections under three generations. The
periodization of the three generations is overlapping and should not be viewed as linear. The type
of disputes the parties bring also reveal the on-going change and expansion in the development
of international investment law to areas and issues outside of core foreign investment protection
and expropriation.
First Generation: 1970s – 1990s
The First Generation of cases are the earliest engagement of African Sates with the ICSID
system.41 These disputes were fundamental in the early stages of ICSID as they underpinned
ICSID’s future development. It is indeed reflective of the reverse contributor status of African
states described in this article that the first dispute before ICSID,42 the first case where an award
was rendered where a state was the claimant,43 and the first successful counter-claim,44 involved
different African states.45 In this regard, the high-profile disputes that I will discuss include
Holiday Inns S.A. & Others v. Morocco;46 Societe Ltd. Benvenuti et Bonfat Srl (Italy) v. The
Government of Congo47; The Pyramids Case48; and the Klockner v. Cameroon disputes.49
The Holiday Inns S.A. & Others v. Morocco (Holiday Inns) dispute popularly dubbed as the first
‘World Bank’ arbitration had Morocco as a Respondent.50 Registered in 1972, it was the first
request for arbitration under the ICSID Convention. Following initial negotiation between
For a list of all these cases, see, Cannu, supra note 7, pages 40-45.
Lynch, “The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes: Selected Case Studies” (1981-1983)
7 International Trade Law Journal, p. 306.
42 Holiday Inns S.A. & Others v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1 (1972).
43 Adriano Gardella SpA v. Cote d’Ivoire, ICSID Case No. ARB/74/1, Award rendered in 1977.
44 Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4
45 Gabon v Societe Serete SA, ICSID Case No. ARB/76/1.
46 Holiday Inns S.A. & Others v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1 (1972).
47 Societe Ltd. Benvenuti et Bonfat Srl (Italy) v. The Government of Congo,
48 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3. Online:
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C135/DC671_En_old.pdf
49 ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2.
50 Pierre Lalive, “The First ‘World Bank’ Arbitration (Holiday Inns v. Morocco): Some Legal Problems”, (1980)
51:1 British Yearbook of International Law, pp. 123-162. The article also provides a very useful account of the facts
of the dispute.
40
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representatives of the parties to the dispute regarding boosting the tourism industry in Morocco
via the construction of hotels, the parties entered into a ‘basic agreement’ joint venture with the
objective of establishing and operating in Morocco four Holiday Inn hotels of 300 rooms each,
namely in Rabat, Marrakesh, Fez and Tangiers. As part of its obligations, the Moroccan
government undertook to provide loans and incentives to the investors towards the completion of
the project. For business related and tax decisions, the investors opted to create a separate
affiliated company: Holiday Inns S.A. Glarus, and Occidental Hotels of Morocco. As at when the
parties signed the basic agreement for the project, Holiday Inn S.A. Glarus, was in the process of
being incorporated while Occidental Hotels of Morocco had in fact not been established. The
Agreement between the parties provided for ICSID arbitration in the event of a dispute. Despite
progress in the construction of the hotels, there was trouble between the parties in relation to the
financing as the Moroccan government not only stopped the payment they were required to
make, but also refused to proceed with the incentives it had promised. Based on the foregoing,
the Claimant commenced the ICSID arbitration. For various reasons, Morocco objected to ICSID
jurisdiction.51 Amongst other things, Holiday Inns dispute therefore raised the question: when is
a contracting state party bound by the ICSID arbitration system? As well as what it means to be
treated as the “national of another Contracting State” for the purpose of Article 25(2)(b) of the
ICSID Convention.52 The tribunal rejected Morocco’s arguments holding that the dispute came
under the ambit of the Convention based on the agreement of the parties. According to the
Tribunal, it is of the opinion that the ICSID Convention allows parties to “subordinate the entry
into force of an arbitration clause to the subsequent fulfillment of certain conditions, such as the
adherence of the States concerned to the Convention, or the incorporation of a company
envisaged under the agreement.”53 The tribunal, however, agreed with the government of
Morocco that the chain of hotels being built did not come under the umbrella of “national of
another Contracting State.”54
If the Holiday Inn dispute indicated the circumstances when a national judiciary will not be
seized of jurisdiction when parties have agreed to arbitration, Societe Ltd. Benvenuti et Bonfat Srl
(Italy) v. The Government of Congo provides another early investment dispute involving African
state before the ICSID where the clarification of the jurisdiction and applicability of the ICSID
arbitration system vis-à-vis the potential role of a local court is examined.55 The dispute arose out
of a joint venture between the claimant Italian firm and the Government of the People’s Republic
of Congo for the establishment of a local company. The local company named PLASCO will
manufacture plastic bottles for mineral water and the ownership structure is divided into 60%
and 40% stakes respectively for the government and the investor. As part of its obligations, the
government was not only required to pay a certain percentage of the company’s share capital, but
also, guarantee the financing of the new company, grant preferential tax status among other
measures aimed at protecting the company; while the investor will in addition to contributing its
For example, “Morocco argued that the parties lacked the capacity to agree to ICSID arbitration because, at the
date of the 1966 basic agreement, neither Morocco nor Switzerland was a party to the ICSID Convention…
Furthermore, the company itself was not yet a legal entity under Swiss law.” W. Michael Tupman, “Case Studies in
the Jurisdiction of the international Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes”, (1986) 35:4 The International
and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 813-838, p. 818.
52 Ibid.
53 Continuing, the Tribunal noted that “On this assumption, it is the date when these conditions are definitely
satisfied, as regards one of the involved, which constitutes in the sense of the Convention the date of consent by that
party.” Ibid, p. 818.
54 Ibid, p. 819.
55 Ibid, p. 823.
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own share capital, operate the plan and guarantee the marketing of the bottles produced.56 As
events unfolded, the government of Congo not only failed to meet its obligations under the
agreement and even after the investor stepped in to mitigate the situation, but also frustrated any
possibility of fruition from the mitigation by the investor. Eventually, the government disposed
PLASCO of the plant and its company offices. The agreement provided that dispute arising will
be settled under the ICSID arbitration. When the investor commenced arbitration under the
ICSID rules, the government of Congo contended the Centre’s jurisdiction on the grounds that
there was a requirement for the exhaustion of local judicial remedies by the investor prior to the
ICSID proceedings57, and that the doctrine of lis pendens required that the action must in any
case be suspended because of a criminal proceeding against a representative of the investor.
While the ICSID Tribunal did not make any pronouncement on the question of exhaustion of
remedies before the judiciary; the Tribunal rejected the lis pendens contention by the government
of Congo as the identity of the parties and the subject matter of dispute were different. While the
priority accorded to ICSID arbitration in terms of exclusivity has been reinforced, this dispute
nevertheless provided as insight into the circumstances where the pendency of an action before a
national court may have impact on an ICSID proceeding.
The Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt (Pyramids
Case)58 dispute provides another illustration of the significance of the jurisprudence that involves
African states. Although the award in this case was made in 1992, the case had begun since the
1980s, hence, I categorize it as part of the First-Generation disputes. The case is particularly
worthy of note because for the first time, an ICSID Tribunal upheld its jurisdiction based on the
Egyptian law. As for the facts, in 1974, Southern Pacific Properties (SPP), entered into
agreements with Egypt to establish a joint venture with a view to developing an international
tourist complex at the Pyramids Oasis in Egypt. SPP’s Egyptian subsidiary, SPP(ME), held 60%
of shares in joint venture company, with the remaining 40% owned by the Egyptian partner. The
project went ahead until 1978 when, as a result of parliamentary opposition, the Government
effectively cancelled the project placing the joint venture company in judicial trusteeship. In
1984, the Claimants decided to take the matter before an ICSID Tribunal, pursuant to Egyptian
Law which contained an ICSID arbitration provision. The Claimants maintained that Egypt’s
actions violated the agreements and amounted to expropriation of the investment, and thus
claimed compensation for the value of their investment in the joint venture company plus
interest. In upholding Egypt’s actions as a lawful expropriation of the Claimants’ investment, the
Tribunal assumed jurisdiction by placing reliance on Egyptian and international law. The
significance of this case has been analyzed by scholars.59
Further in the context of First-Generation investment disputes involving Africa states that has
contributed to the development of international investment law is the case of Klockner v.

Ibid.
Summarizing the relevant provisions of the agreement between the parties, Tupman, stated that “Article 25 of the
PLASCO by-laws provided that any dispute between the shareholders concerning corporate matters, or between the
shareholders and the company, “which have not been settled either by the competent courts of the corporate
jurisdiction or, by negotiation, shall be arbitrated under the [ICSID] Convention.” Ibid, p. 824.
58 W. Laurence Craig, “The Final Chapter in the Pyramids Case: Discounting an ICSID Award for Annulment
Risk”, (1993) 8:2 ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal, pp. 264-293.
59 For example, see, Jan Paulson, “Arbitration without Privity”, (1995) 10:2 ICSID Review – Foreign Investment
Law Journal, pp. 232-257.
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Cameroon.60 Klockner is historic in the sense that it was the first investment dispute that
provided an avenue for an arbitral decision on the concept of annulment. In this regard, the case
carries on the theme of clarifying and affirming ICSID rules on annulment, which, in the context
of ICSID arbitration, is a remedy of an extraordinary nature in the sense that ICSID awards are
final and binding on the parties to the dispute.61 Annulment is one of the hand-full of post-award
remedies available under the ICSID Convention as an exceptional recourse to safeguard against
the violation of fundamental legal principles relating to the process.62
Klockner, a German company, and two subsidiaries of Klockner instituted an arbitration
proceeding against Cameroon and the Societe Camerounaise des Engrais under the ICSID
proceeding. The arbitration which commenced in 1981 ended in 1983 with an arbitral award and
a dissenting opinion.63 A year later, Klockner sought to have the award annulled under the
provisions of Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. In 1985, an ad hoc Committee that was
established pursuant to the provisions of Article 52(3) of the ICSID Convention annulled the
award. The implication of the annulment was that the dispute was re-submitted to ICSID
arbitration. Despite the criticism that the annulment proceedings drew, particularly with respect
to exceeding their jurisdiction by re-examining the merits of the case and obscuring the lines
between an appeal and annulment64, the case demonstrates the contribution of African states as
parties to investment disputes before the ICSID.
In addition to the foregoing, an African state – the Democratic Republic of Congo – was the first
to file an application for revision of an award in 198865 and so was the first conciliation
proceedings under the Convention.66 An important fact that derives from the examination of
some of the First-Generation cases is that African states have simply carried on the momentum
as far as their engagement with the ICSID regime is concerned. They are indeed primary users of
the system and the First-Generation of disputes involving African state parties have been crucial
to the development of the first two decades of ICSID dispute system.
Second-Generation: 2000s - 2010
In this section, I move the analyses forward by examining a different the set of cases involving
African states as parties from the 2000s. By way of overview, this category of disputes not only
Another dispute involving an African State that is relevant and illustrative of the jurisprudence on partial
annulment in ICSID, is Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, Dec. 22, 1989, 4
ICSID Rep. (1997).
61 Christoph Schreuer, “Three Generations of ICSID Annulment Proceedings”, [*], pp. 17-42;
62 Article 52(1) provides that “Either party may request annulment of the award by an application in writing
addressed to the Secretary-General on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;
(c)
that
there
was
corruption
on
the
part
of
a
member
of
the Tribunal; (d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that
the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.”
63 For a useful summary of the case and dissenting opinion, see, Jan Paulsson, “The ICSID Klockner v. Cameroon
Award: the Duties of Partners in North-South Economic Development Agreements”, (1984) 1 Journal of
International Arbitration, 145; Friedrich Nigggemann, “The ICSID Klockner v. Cameroon Award: the Dissenting
Opinion,” (1984) 1 Journal of International Arbitration, 331.
64 Mark B. Feldman, “The Annulment Proceedings and the Finality of ICSID Arbitral Awards, (1987) 2 ICSID
Review Foreign Investment Law Journal 85.
65 American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc v. Democratic Republic of Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1.
66 SEDITEX v. Madagascar, ICSID Case No CONC/82/1
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clarify rules such as those relating to amicus curiae and certain standards of treatment of
investments, but also, they reinforce the rule of law as an instrument against corruption in
foreign investment relations, expropriation, clarification of the concept of “investment”67,
procedural matters going to transparency of international investment arbitration, and broader
societal concerns beyond pure investment focus. For example, in the 2005 case of Wena Hotels
Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, the first application for interpretation was filed.68 Similarly,
in the case of BSG Resources Limited (in administration), BSG Resources (Guinea) Limited and
BSG Resources (Guinea) SARL v. Republic of Guinea, for the first time, parties agreed to apply
the 2014 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration in an
ICSID arbitration.69 In the remaining section of the Second-Generation, I will focus on Salini
Costruttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v. Kingdom of Morocco;70 World Duty Free v. Kenya;71
Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania72 as disputes involving
African States and exemplifying their contribution to the development of international
investment law.
The Salini v Morocco dispute provides a unique and original addition to the list of cases with
African parties as respondents which yielded a consequential award – this time in relation to the
test for the determination of “investment.” The ICSID Convention did not define the notion of
“investment.”73 The dispute arose from an agreement entered into in 1994 between the Claimants
and the Kingdom of Morocco for the construction of part of a highway connecting different
regions in Morocco. The construction work was undertaken by the Claimants and duly
completed in 1999. It was their effort to recover claims for compensation that had been refused
by relevant agencies of the Kingdom of Morocco that led to this dispute. In 2000, the Claimants
submitted a request on the basis of the ICSID arbitration clause in the bilateral investment treaty
between the government of Italy and the Kingdom of Morocco. In response, the Moroccan
government raised a number of objections. They contended that the Tribunal lacked subject
matter jurisdiction as a contract for the construction of a highway could not be characterized as
an investment but as contract for services. In addition, they argued that Tribunal did not have
ratione personae jurisdiction.74 In its decision on the meaning of “investment”, the Tribunal
provided four-way criteria75 that has been critically engaged in the literature as not mandatory.76
Upon applying the test, the Tribunal found that the construction work engaged in by the
Claimant could not qualify as an investment within the meaning of Article 25 of the Washington
Convention.

For example, see, American Manufacturing and Trading (AMT) v. République du Zaïre, [*]
ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4
69 ICSID Case No. ARB/14/22
70 ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4
71 ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7. The Metal-Tech Ltd v the Republic of Uzbekistan falls into this category as well.
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award of 4 October 2013
72 ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22
73 Julian Davis Mortenson, “The Meaning of “Investment”: ICSID’s Travuax and the Domain of International
Investment Law”, (2010) 51:1 Harvard Journal of International Law, pp. 257-318
74 Emmanuel Gaillard and Yas Banifatemi, “Introductory Note to ICSID: Salini Contruttori SPA and Italstrade SPA
v. Kingdom of Morocco (Proceeding on Jurisdiction)”, (2003) 42:3 International Legal Materials, pp. 606-608.
75 Drawing on a mix of the activity in question in this case and scholarly writings, the Tribunal developed the
following criteria: the existence of contributions; a certain duration in the performance of the contract; participation
in the risks of the transaction; the transaction contributes to the economic development of the host state.
76 Alex Grabowski, “The Definition of Investment under the ICSID Convention: A Defense of Salini”, (2014) 15:1
Chicago Journal of international Law, pp. 289-308.
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68

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3354059

Another important case in the Second-Generation that has generated significant analyses in the
context of ICSID jurisprudence is the World Duty Free v Kenya. Prior to discussing the case, it is
important to provide a brief context of corruption and anti-corruption, particularly as it relates to
developing countries of the African continent.77 Foreign direct investment and economic
development, especially in developing countries, are two sides of the same coin that have
implications for economic growth. While corruption remains an important scourge across the
African continent, in the majority of known cases of major corruption in African States, there is
an international dimension or party that is also involved. In the context of foreign investment
contracts, allegations of corruption in the procurement process remains an important obstacle to
the realization of the maximum economic and social development in African states. In reality,
the multinational and transnational corporations that are involved in the bribery for the award of
the contracts and projects have hardly been held accountable.78
Bearing the foregoing in mind, the World Duty Free v. Kenya, is refreshing in its deployment of
the ICSID arbitration for the pursuit of rule of law and anti-corruption in foreign investment. In
1989, Kenya concluded an agreement for the construction, maintenance, and operation of dutyfree complexes at its Nairobi and Mombassa International Airports—with a company called the
“House of Perfume” (incorporated under the laws of the Isle of Man, United Kingdom). In June
2000, an Isle of Man corporation, World Duty Free Company Ltd, launched arbitral proceedings
against the Republic of Kenya under the ICSID convention. It did so pursuant to an arbitration
clause in a contract by which World Duty Free had been awarded the exclusive concession to run
the duty-free operations at Kenya’s international airports in Nairobi and Mombassa.79 As part of
its case, the Claimant adduced evidence to the effect that the contract was procured after the
payment of bribe. However, they contended that they were “gifts” which were cultural in Kenya
and had in fact been legitimized when the government accepted them.80 On their part, the
government of Kenya did not join issues with the Claimant on this point. Rather, they asked for
an immediate dismissal of the claims on the ground that they were contrary to public policy,
Odumosu, Ibironke T. "International Investment Arbitration and Corruption Claims: An Analysis of World Duty
Free v. Kenya," (2011) 4:3 The Law and Development Review, pp. 88-129; Tamar Meshel, “The Use and Misuse of
the Corruption Defence in International Investment Arbitration”, (2013) 30 J. INT’L ARB. 267; Margareta Habazin,
“Investor Corruption as a Defense Strategy of Host States in International Investment Arbitration: Investors’ Corrupt
Acts Give an Unfair Advantage to Host States in Investment Arbitration”, (2017) 18:805 Cardozo Journal of
Conflict Resolution, pp 805-828.
78 For literature that discusses the intertwined nature of corruption and foreign direct investment, see, Mohsin Habib
and Leon Zurawicki, “Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment”, (2002) 33:2 Journal of International Business
Studies, pp. 291-307;
79 For an account of the facts and insights of this case by the counsel on record for the Republic of Kenya, see,
Constantine Partasides, World Duty Free v. The Republic of Kenya: a Unique Precedent, Chatham House
International Law Discussion Group, 28 March 2007. Online: https://star.worldbank.org/corruptioncases/sites/corruption-cases/files/documents/arw/Moi_World_Duty_Free_Chatham_House_Mar_28_2007.pdf;
Travis Edwards, “Corruption as a Jurisdictional Barrier in Investment Arbitration: Consequences and Solutions” The
Global Anticorruption Blog, July 17, 2007. Online: https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/tag/world-duty-free-vkenya/
80 The Claimant’s counsel built there case of three arguments in contending that it should not be dismissed: “(i) First
we were told that “gifts” of this kind are customary practice and culturally sanctioned in Kenya, and thus could
involve no illegality; (ii) Secondly, as this “gift” had been paid to the head of state, the personification of the state,
the state itself had received the payment, and had relevant knowledge of the payment, and had therefore affirmed the
contract – even if there had been any earlier illegality; and (iii) thirdly and finally, the Claimant asked the Tribunal
to “accept” the “messy realities of international business in the 1970s and 1980s in the developing word”, and to
“balance the venality” of the “giving” and “taking” of a bribe so as not to punish the payer to the advantage of the
“receiver”” Ibid, pp. 3-4.
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unenforceable and that the “machinery of international justice was not available to enforce the
fruit” of illegality.81 The decision of the Tribunal was rendered six years later by a panel of three
Arbitrators that the contract which was the basis of the dispute by the Claimant had been
procured based on the payment of bribe to the then Kenyan Head of State – President Daniel
arap Moi. Premised on this fact, the claims of the Claimant were dismissed in their entirety as
one that is contrary to international public policy and therefore unenforceable. An interesting fact
that the World Duty Free adds to the jurisprudence of ICSID Tribunal relates to the power of an
arbitrator, even in cases where parties have not raised illegality, to suo moto address such public
policy issue and not feel constrained to its brief as derived from the agreement of the parties to
the dispute. Further, the case stands as the first of its kind in ICSID where a matter was struck
out by an Arbitral Tribunal on non-jurisdictional basis.82
Furthermore, the case Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania,
provides a rich example of investment dispute involving an African state with consequential
tribunal awards – substantive and procedural – beyond the case itself. In this regard, the dispute
raises issues relating to sustainable development, expropriation in the context of foreign
investment, transparency in and legitimacy of investor-state dispute settlement, consideration of
broader societal concerns relating to environmental health and water.83 The case also adds to the
jurisprudence of the ICSID on the definition of “investment” under the ICSID Convention as
well as amicus curiae participation in international investment disputes. In addition, for the first
time, a deliberation and order were issued by a Tribunal on the question of disclosure of arbitral
proceedings thereby contributing to the debate for greater transparency in international
investment arbitration.84
The World Bank provided Tanzania some funding for the repair, upgrade, and expansion of the
water and sewage infrastructure of the city of Dar es Salaam.85 A condition of the funding was
that the United Republic of Tanzania will appoint a private company for the purposes of
managing and operating the infrastructure improvements. The Claimant - Biwater Gauff
(Tanzania) Limited, a private water company – emerged as the preferred bidder for the
management of the infrastructure improvements. BGT is a joint venture created by Biwater
International Limited and HP Gauff Ingenieure GmbH & Co. for the purposes of the Tanzanian
project; Biwater owns 80% of BGT and Gauff owns 20%. The Claimant subsequently entered
into agreements with various Tanzanian subcontractors as part of the conditions of its contract.
Three years into the implementation of the project – May 2005, the Tanzanian government and
the Dar es Salaam Water and Sewage Authority terminated the contract of one of the
subcontractors and proceeded to expropriate its assets.86 In its claim before the ICSID Tribunal
Ibid, p. 3.
Danielle Young, “Is Corruption an Emerging Cause of Action in Investor-State Arbitration?”, The Global
Anticorruption Blog, January 22, 2016. Online: https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2016/01/22/is-corruption-anemerging-cause-of-action-in-investor-state-arbitration-2/
83 Frances Aldson, “Biwater v. Tanzania: do corporations have human rights and sustainable development
obligations stemming from private sector involvement in natural resource provision?” (2010) 2 Environmental
Liability, pp. 58-66.
84 Katia Fach Gómez, “Rethinking the Role of Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: How to Draw
the Line Favourably for the Public Interest”, (2012) 35:2 Fordham International Law Journal, pp. 513-524;
85 World Bank, “Tanzania – Dar es Salaam Water Supply and Sanitation Project”, Report No. PID7578, 4 February
2003, online: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/216391468778537045/pdf/multi0page.pdf;
86
John Vidal, “Flagship water privatization fails in Tanzania”, The Guardian, 25, May 2005,
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/may/25/uk.world
81
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in August 2005, the Claimant (being partly British and German company) argued that the
Tanzanian government had breached the terms of a 1994 bilateral investment treaty between the
United Kingdom and Tanzania for the Promotion and Protection of Investments and was also in
violation of the provisions of the Tanzanian Investment Act. On its part, the Tanzanian
government contended that the Citywater contract was terminated because it did not have
sufficient funds to execute the project with such significant implications for public health and
welfare. Hence, it was left with no option than to expropriate the project in the interest of the
public. In the ICSID proceeding, amicus briefs were received from Tanzanian and international
non-governmental organizations in support of the Tanzanian Government.87 For the NGOs, they
argued that investor responsibilities in the sustainable development and human rights contexts88
extend to specific issues such as duty to apply proper standards and due diligence procedures, the
principle of pacta sunt servanda, duty of good faith, and a duty to abide by the investor’s general
responsibilities.
Refusing the Republic of Tanzania’s argument, the Tribunal ruled in favour of the Claimant that
the actions of the Tanzanian government amounted to an expropriation of the Claimant’s
investment under the bilateral investment treaty. In particular, the tribunal ruled that the Republic
of Tanzania had not acted in a fair and equitable manner in engaging in unreasonable and
discriminatory conduct for informing the public of the termination of the contract when in fact it
had not done so. However, the Tribunal did not award any monetary compensation to the
Claimant as there was no value ascribed to the company as at the time of expropriation.89
First, the dispute adds to the ICSID jurisprudence on the clarification of the concept of
“investment.” Article 25 of the ICSID Convention provides that ICSID Tribunals can only
assume jurisdiction over certain legal disputes. In this regard, a jurisdictional requirement is that
the dispute in question must have been borne directly out of an “investment” – a term that is not
defined in the ICSID Convention. The United Republic of Tanzania had argued that meaning of
“investment” under the ICSID Convention has now been determined by the case law and
required the establishment of the “Salini” test.90 The Tribunal, however, rejected the argument of
the Tanzanian government on the ground that the application of the Salini test to define
“investment” is not mandatory or static as they are merely factors that should be taken into
account. In defining “investment”, the critical point of reference that should inform the meaning
The amicus curiae brief filed by The Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team; The Legal and Human Rights Centre;
The Tanzania Gender Networking Programme; The Center for International Environmental Law; and The
International
Institute
for
Sustainable
Development
is
available
online:
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/investment_amicus_final_march_2007.pdf. “The brief argues that BGT’s acts and
omissions caused its investment to fail and that investors in the water sector have a heightened level of responsibility
because the success of a business venture in this area has a direct impact on the achievement of an essential human
right - the right to clean and safe water. The brief further argues that taking into consideration human rights and
sustainable development, termination of the contract by a government, if done in good faith to prevent the worsening
or abuse of human rights, should not be found to be a contractual breach, especially when a contract’s purpose was
to promote and enhance the achievement of such rights.” Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, “BiwaterTanzania arbitration”, online: https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/biwater-tanzania-arbitration.
88 Graham Mayeda, “Sustainable International Investment Agreements: Challenges and Solutions or Developing
Countries” M. Gehring, M.-C. Cordonier Segger & A. Newcombe (Eds.), Sustainable development in world
investment law, (2011, Kluwer Law International), p. 535.
89 Expropriation claims remains a contentious aspect of the Tribunal awards and the Third-Generation cases
involving Zimbabwe sheds some more light on this aspect of ICSID tribunal jurisprudence.
90 This requires the establishment of a 5-stage test: (1) adequate duration; (2) regularity of profit and return; (3) risk;
(4) substantial commitment of resources, financial or otherwise; and (5) contribution to the host state’s development.
87

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3354059

ascribed is the relevant bilateral investment treaty. Indeed, rather than the narrow and strict
approach in Phoenix v Czech Republic91, the Tribunal adopted a broad approach to defining
“investment.”
Second, the dispute provided an important procedural clarification on the participation of amicus
curiae in international investment arbitration under the ICSID Arbitration Rules. It should in fact
be noted that although it was not necessarily a direct consequence of the final outcome of the
case, that the Arbitration Rules were amended to clarify that tribunals are empowered to allow
submissions by amicus curiae and provide guidelines for their intervention is an important
development from this case.92 That the amici in this case were allowed to intervene was a result
of this revision which has become part of the international investment jurisprudence. The
Claimant’s contention that the interventions by amici will not be relevant was accordingly
rejected by the Tribunal. The significance of the Tribunal’s acceptance of and copious references
to the amici contributions are further significant in that “it recognizes and affirms the public
interest in investor-state disputes, helps normalize the idea of non-party participation, helps
ensure that investor-state disputes take into account broader issues such as sustainable
development and human rights where relevant, promotes investor and government accountability
and enhances the perceived legitimacy of the system.”93
Third, in addition to the substantive issues dealt with in this case, there is also a significant
procedural contribution from the dispute.94 One of the questions that the Tribunal adopted
Procedural Order No. 3 to deal with was the unilateral decision by the United Republic of
Tanzania to disclose certain documents relating to the proceeding in the public realm. The
Tribunal also addressed for the first time the issue regarding the publication of documents during
the arbitral proceedings in detail. As Christina Knahr argues, the Order is noteworthy for two
reasons: “first, the tribunal’s thoroughly weighing of transparency against procedural integrity
and non-aggravation of the dispute; and second, its separate examination of various kinds of
documents produced during the proceedings with respect to their suitability for publication.” 95
Indeed, the order of the Tribunal is a “valuable contribution to increasing clarity on how to
address the issue of publication of documents in arbitral proceedings” and “the novelty of the
order lies in the differential treatment of various kinds of documents produced by the parties as
well as the tribunal in the course of the proceedings and the tribunal’s distinct conclusions
regarding these documents.”96

ICISD Case No. ARB/06/5.
N. Bernasconi-Osterwalder, “Transparency and amicus curiae in ICSID arbitration: Lessons learned from Biwater
Gauff v. Tanzania,” in M. Gehring, M.-C. Cordonier Segger & A. Newcombe (Eds.), Sustainable development in
world investment law, (2011, Kluwer Law International), p. 189.
93 Lise Johnson, Commentary on “Biwater v. Tanzania”, International Institute for Sustainable Development,
October 18, 2018. Online: https://www.iisd.org/itn/2018/10/18/biwater-v-tanzania/
94 Fiona Marshall, “The Precarious State of Sunshine: Case Comment on Procedural Orders in the Biwater Gauff
(Tanzania) Ltd. v. Tanzania Investor-State Arbitration”, (2007) McGill Journal of Sustainable Development Law,
3:2 pp. 181-203
95 Christina Knahr, “Introductory Note to International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID):
Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No.
3 (2007) 46:1 International Legal Materials, pp. 12-14, p. 12.
96 Ibid, p. 13.
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Third-Generation: 2010 – to Date
The Third-Generation of investment disputes involving African states start from 2010 to the
present moment. Like the previous generations, the Third-Generation disputes represent a
significant and radical extension of the frontiers of issues in ICSID investment disputes
jurisprudence. This category of investment disputes interestingly incorporates new themes such
as – sustainable development, human rights, protection of indigenous rights and environmental
standards to mention a few – in the broader discourse on international investment. Although
human rights concerns have not traditionally been included in international investment treaties,
human rights and indigenous peoples’ rights where the dispute relates to land will remain critical
in the debate on the future of investment arbitration as the Second and Third Generation of
investment disputes involving African countries show.97
For the purpose of this article, I will focus on the following disputes: Menzies Middles East and
Africa SA and Aviation Handling Services International Ltd. v. Republic of Senegal;98 and
Bernhard von Pezold and others v. Zimbabwe.99 These disputes challenge the systemic
integration between international investment law and other areas of the law. They have also
opened new vista with respect to broader developments in Africa, new models of investment
agreements and even the use of remedies such as restitution which is scarcely ordered in ICSID
arbitration.
The dispute in Bernhard von Pezold and others v. Zimbabwe100 arose from complaints of
expropriation without compensation by the Government of Zimbabwe of large agricultural estate
belonging to the claimants. The claimants allege that they have been unfairly targeted as part of
Zimbabwe’s land reform process that had begun since the 1980s. Bernhard von Pezold and his
family, who are dual Swiss and German nationals, bought 78,275 hectares of farmland in
Zimbabwe starting in 1988 under the Switzerland–Zimbabwe and Germany–Zimbabwe bilateral
investment treaties.101 Following an amendment to the constitution of Zimbabwe in 2005, the
Zimbabwean state acquired title to most of the claimants’ land, revoked their right to challenge
the acquisition, and criminalized their continued occupancy of the land. While Zimbabwe
admitted the allegation of expropriation, they contended that it had been done for the purposes of
Silvia Steininger, “What’s Human Rights Got To Do With It? An Empirical Analysis of Human Rights
References in Investment Arbitration” (2018) 31 Leiden Journal of International Law, pp. 33-58, p. 34; P.
Muchlinski, ‘Holistic Approaches to Development and International Investment Law: The Role of International
Investment Agreements’, in J. Faundez and C. Tan (eds.), International Economic Law, Globalization and
Developing Countries (2010), 180
98 ICSID Case No. ARB/15/21
99 ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15. Other cases involving African states in this generation that have either affirmed
principles of international investment law or added to the ICSID jurisprudence in other notable ways include:
Millicom International Operations B.V. and Sentel GSM SA v. The Republic of Senegal, ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/20; Helnan International Hotels A/S v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19; International
Quantum Resources Limited, Frontier SPRL and Compagnie Miniere de Sakania SPRL v. Democratic Republic of
the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/21.
100 J. Cameron Mowatt and Celeste Mowatt, “Boarder Timbers and Others v. Zimbabwe and von Pezold and Others
v. Zimbabwe”, (2013) 28:1 ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal, pp. 33-44.
101 Jacob Greenberg, “ICSID tribunal orders Zimbabwe to return expropriated farms”, May 16, 2016, International
Institute for Sustainable Development, online: https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/05/16/icsid-tribunal-orders-zimbabweto-return-expropriated-farms-bernhard-von-pezold-and-others-v-zimbabwe-icsid-case-no-arb-10-15-jacobgreenberg/
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transferring the land to indigenous Zimbabweans. Further amendments to Zimbabwe’s
constitution in 2013 provide full compensation for land seized from “indigenous Zimbabweans”
and reaffirmed the right of foreign investors to full compensation under the bilateral investment
treaties.102
With respect to the expropriation claim, the Tribunal rejected Zimbabwe’s argument that the
estate was lawfully acquired for public purpose and to compensate for the historically
disadvantaged indigenous people of Zimbabwe. In ruling in favor of the Claimant, the Tribunal
found Zimbabwean government’s expropriation of the estate of the Claimant as unlawful,
without compensation, racially discriminatory, and a violation of the bilateral investment treaties
Zimbabwe signed with Germany and Switzerland. The tribunal also found that the actions of the
Zimbabwean government violated fair and equitable treatment provisions of the bilateral
investment treaties. The remedy order for the violations was also unconventional. The tribunal
ordered restitution as an appropriate and feasible remedy for the purposes of this case.
The dispute also enriches the growing jurisprudence of ICSID on amici curiae and interventions
by NGOs on the basis of human rights violations. In Bernhard von Pezold and others v.
Zimbabwe, the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) and several
Zimbabwean indigenous communities sought permission to be join as amici curiae in the arbitral
proceedings. The ECCHR had sought to join because of the involvement of European investors.
ECCHR, together with the indigenous chiefs, sought to draw the tribunal's attention to the fact
that these properties are located on the ancestral territories of the native peoples. On this issue,
the Tribunal rejected the request to participate as amici curiae on the grounds that: (i) the amici
had not demonstrated that their submission would assist the tribunal in determining a factual or
legal issue related to the proceedings, address a matter within the scope of the dispute, or would
flow from any significant interest they had in the proceeding103; and (ii) that the amici were not
independent from Zimbabwe. Luca Bastin argues that the Tribunal created an extra layer of
burden for would-be amici curiae by requiring an appearance of or “apparent independence” of
the amicus into the provisions of ICSID Arbitration Rule 37.104 The decision of the tribunal has
also been described as conservative compared to other instances where ICSID tribunal allowed
the intervention of NGOs in previous cases on the basis of the human rights law.
Another ICSID case in the current dispensation that involved an African state as Respondent and
illustrated the overlap, though divergent, of principles of Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) in
international trade law via-s-vis international investment law is Menzies Middles East and Africa
SA and Aviation Handling Services International Ltd. v. Republic of Senegal.105 In the context of
this case, ICSID tribunal upheld Senegal’s objection to jurisdiction and dismissed the
applicability of MFN clause provision in World Trade Organization (WTO) General Agreement
in Trade and Services (GATS) as a way to find that Senegal consented to ICSID international
arbitration. In 2003, the claimants acquired Aviation Handling Services SA (AHS SA). The
company was created under Senegalese law for the purpose of ground handling activities in
Zimbabwe’s Constitution of 2013, online: http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/zim127325.pdf; James Tsabora,
“Reflections on the Constitutional Revolution of Property and Land Rights under the 2013 Zimbabwean
Constitution”, (2016) 60:2 Journal of African Law, pp. 213-229.
103 That is a straight application of the rules for joining amicus curiae under ICSID Arbitration Rule 37(2).
104 Lucas Bastin, “Amici Curiae in Investor-State Arbitrations: Two Recent Decisions”, (2013) Australian
International Law Journal, pp. 95-104.
105 Rebecca Hekman, Nadege Huart and Janet Whittaker, “Menzies Middle East and Africa S.A. and Aviation
Handling Services International Ltd. v. Republic of Senegal”, (2017) 16:1 World Trade Review, pp. 143-147.
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Senegalese airports. Problem ensued for the company when its activities was temporarily
suspended based national investigations relating to illicit enrichment and collusion in illicit
enrichment under Senegalese local laws. When AHS SA’s Senegalese principals were eventually
found guilty and the assets of the company confiscated, the claimants sued before ICSID
contending the illegality of the actions of the Senegalese government under general international
law and bilateral investment treaties with Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Senegal’s
objections to jurisdiction were three-fold: that Senegal did not consent to arbitration; that there
was no investment made in Senegal by the claimants; and also disputed the Senegalese
nationality of the claimants. The claimants relied on provisions of the WTO GATS, Senegalese
investment code, bilateral investment treaties between Senegal and Netherlands on the one hand,
and Senegal and the United Kingdom on the other hand. In refusing the claimant’s argument, the
tribunal found that the GATS does not provide the basis for consent to arbitration in any form
and could not be the basis for imputing an unequivocal consent to Senegal.106 According to the
tribunal, the decision to not uphold its obligations under GATS is an exercise of the Senegalese
government’s sovereign prerogative, the breach of which appropriate dispute mechanism is
provided for under GATS.
Based on the forgoing analyses, an undeniable and important narrative emerges regarding the
contribution of international investment disputes involving African States to the development of
the international investment law regime: ICSID arbitration rulings involving African states have
been critical to the development of international investment law.107 These disputes have provided
a significant opportunity for the elaboration of ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules, the
relationship of international investment law to other areas of the law such as human rights law,
international trade law and public international law broadly conceived. Specifically, from
clarifications regarding the notion of an investment, standards of treatment, standards of
protection – expropriation, procedural aspects relating to admissibility, remedies, national
investment laws, transparency before the ICSID with consequential actions leading to the
amendment of ICSID Arbitration Rules, and corruption to mention a few, African states, mostly
as respondents, have been fundamental to the development of international investment law over
the years.
Part III
Concluding Remarks – Entrenching Africa’s Contribution to ICSID
The primary aim of this article was to provide an account of the contributions of African states to
the development of international investment law over the years based on their participation in
ICSID disputes. Despite the questions regarding the status of the ‘equality’ regarding their
involvement, African states’ participation, both numerical and consent contexts, were critical to
the establishment of ICSID. In the operational phase of ICSID, the analysis of the participation
of African states in ICSID, particularly as parties to disputes has drawn significant critical
reflection that draw attention to the power relations embedded in the system, apparent lack of
For a brief summary of the decision, see, Suzy H. Nikièma, “ICSID tribunal dismisses MFN clause in WTO
GATS as a means of importing Senegal’s consent to arbitration from third party BIT”, December 12, 2016,
International Institute for Sustainable Development, online: https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/12/12/mfn-clause-wtogats-importing-consent-arbitration-third-party-bit-menzies-middle-east-africa-aviation-handling-servicesinternational-senegal/
107 Cannu’s recent article provides a fascinating empirical analysis of various sectors that the disputes have emerged.
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diversity108 in the calibre, gender, and geographical pool of ICSID arbitrators, and cultural
differences. The article acknowledges that these critiques are well-founded and will need to be
addressed.
While the project for the reform of ICSID109 and entrenchment of the participation of African
states, and African arbitrators in ICSID arbitration continues, the article made the point that we
must also reclaim the various contributions that the participation of African states in ICSID
dispute has made to the overall development of ICSID case law and international investment
law. In this regard, the article conceptualizes African states as reverse contributors – a concept
that was adopted and analyzed precisely to demonstrate the complexity of the historical and
extant context of the participation of African States in ICSID. The concept does not distinguish
between the law firms as counsel and the states in the sense of originator of the arguments. It is
deliberately broad to indicate the mutuality of the relationship in that regard and to capture the
fact that the states have their narratives that provide the factual basis for the arguments by the
arbitrators, quite distinctly from the legal and technical aspects.
To interrogate the reverse contributions, the article examined analyzed some disputes involving
African states over three generations that are overlapping and not linear. The First Generation of
cases are the earliest engagement of African Sates with the ICSID system. These disputes were
provided the earlier opportunities for arbitrators to clarify concepts and the applicability of
ICSID rules and procedures. The Second Generation of disputes were critical not only to clarify
rules such as those relating to amicus curiae and certain standards of treatment of investments,
but also, they reinforce the rule of law as an instrument against corruption in foreign investment
relations, expropriation, clarification of the concept of “investment”, procedural matters going to
transparency of international investment arbitration, and broader societal concerns beyond pure
investment focus. The Third Generation of disputes analyzed in the article represent a significant
and radical extension of the frontiers of issues in ICSID investment disputes jurisprudence. This
category of investment disputes interestingly incorporates new themes such as – sustainable
development, human rights, protection of indigenous rights and environmental standards to
mention a few – in the broader discourse on international investment. Although human rights
concerns have not traditionally been included in international investment treaties, the article
notes that human rights, sustainability and indigenous peoples’ rights concerns, particularly as
they are implicated in the disputes involving African States, will remain critical in the debate on
the future of investment arbitration.
Looking forward, foreign direct investment in African states is far from its point of
maximization. As new opportunities emerge for investment and transnational companies invest
For an account of the effort ICSID is making to promote diversity, see, Meg Kinnear, “Advancing diversity in
international
dispute
settlement”,
The
World
Bank
Blog,
March
8,
2019:
Online:
https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/advancing-diversity-international-dispute-settlement
109 For current efforts aimed at reforms in the ICSID rules and procedure, see, the ICSID Secretariat’s recently
published second working paper on proposals for rule amendments (Working Paper # 2), dated March 15, 2019.
ICSID, “ICSID Rues and Regulations Amendment Process”, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/amendments.
Based on a quick review of the contributors listed on the document that provided suggestions for reform, I
suggest that ICSID engage more with Arbitrators from Africa to build their input in this process. There are many top
law firms on the continent that advise on various transactions with their international counterparts, ICSID can
certainly do more in terms of reaching out for their involvement in this and future processes. For example of the type
of law firms and arbitrators, see, Kamal Shah, John Miles, & Tunde Fagbohunlu, Arbitration in Africa: A Review of
Key Jurisdictions, (2016: Sweet & Maxwell)
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in the economic development of African states, the ICSID Arbitration system will continue to be
an important forum for the settlement of investment disputes given the comfort they afford to the
investors. The natural implication of the continuing recourse to the ICSID system is that
opportunities for the development of new jurisprudence that address new areas of investment
opportunities will arise. One hopes that narrative regarding the participation of African states, as
parties to ICSID dispute will consolidate in even more substantive ways to the development of
ICSID case law and international investment law jurisprudence in general.
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